The dying declaration is the statement by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances resulting in his death. It is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of the deceased whether the death is homicidal or suicidal provided the statement relates to the cause of death or exhibits circumstance leading to his death. Section 32 is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence and unless evidence is tested by cross examination it is not creditworthy. A dying declaration made by a person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself guarantee of the truth of the statement of the deceased regarding circumstances leading to his death. Greater solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of dying man because a person on the verge of his death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case as to implicate an innocent person but the Court has to be on guard against the statement of the deceased being a result of either tutoring prompting or a product of his imagination. The court must also be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement after he had clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the court is satisfied about its authenticity and voluntariness the court can found a conviction on the basis thereof in the absence of any corroboration. Under Indian Law for dying declaration to be admissible in evidence it is not necessary that the maker of the statement at the time of making the statement should be under shadow of death and should entertain the belief that his death was imminent. The expectation of imminent death is not the requirement of law. 

Section 32 of the Act do not necessitate that the dying declaration should be before the magistrate. 

It is not always necessary that a dying declaration should be certified by a doctor before reliance could be placed on the same. But then in the absence of any such certificate the courts should be satisfied that from the material on record it is safe to place reliance on such uncertified declaration.   

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled as Subhash Soni & Anr. Vs. State of M.P. decided on 6.5.2009 has held:   

“Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of crossexamination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction on the same without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992(2) SCC 474) (SCC pp.480-81, paras 18-19) 

1. There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. 

[See: Munnu Raja v. State of M.P.(1976 (3) SCC 104)] 

1. If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. 

(See: State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985(1) SCC 552) and 

Ramawati  Devi v. State of Bihar 1983(1) SCC 211) 

1. The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. 

[K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor(1976(3) SCC 618)]) (iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 

[Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.(1974(4) SCC 264)] 

5. Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. 

[Kake Singh v. State of M.P.(1981 Supp. SCC 25)] 

5. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. 

[Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.(1981(2)SCC 654] 

5. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. 

(State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 

Supp. SCC 455)] 

5. Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. 

[Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar (1980 Supp.SCC 769)]

5. Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 

[Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P.(1988 Supp. SCC 152)] 

5. Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. 

[State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989 (3) SCC 390)] 

5. Where there are more than one statements in the nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of the dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. 

[Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982 (1) 

SCC 700)] 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court Of India in the case titled as Atbir Vs.Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi (Criminal Appeal No. 870 Of 2006) Decided on  9-8- 2010 has held: 

This Court in a series of decisions enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of the maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to be taken into account. 

In Munnu Raja and Another vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 

(1976) 3 SCC 104, this Court held:- 

"....It is well settled that though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross- examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated...." 

It is true that in the same decision, it was held, since the Investigating Officers are naturally interested in the success of the investigation and the practice of the Investigating Officer himself recording a dying declaration during the course of an investigation ought not to have been encouraged. 

In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126, this Court held that lapse on the part of the Investigation Officer in not bringing the Magistrate to record the statement of the deceased should not be taken in favour of the accused. This Court further held that a statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to make the statement. 

The effect of dying declaration not recorded by the Magistrate was considered and reiterated in Balbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283. 

Paragraph 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under: 

"23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473, this Court categorically held that there was no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate. This Court therein noted its earlier decision in Ram Bihari Yadav  v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517, wherein it was   also held that the dying declaration need not be in the form of questions and answers. (See also Laxman v. State of 

Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710)." 

It is clear that merely because the dying declaration was not recorded by the Magistrate, by itself cannot be a ground to reject the whole prosecution case. It also clarified that where    the declaration is wholly inconsistent or contradictory statements are made or if it appears from the records that the dying declaration is not reliable, a question may arise as to why the Magistrate was not called for, but ordinarily the same may not be insisted upon. 

This Court further held that the statement of the injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR. 

In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550, the view in Balbir Singh's case(supra) has been reiterated. The following conclusions are relevant which read as under: 

"14. Though conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration, without any corroboration the same should not be suffering from any infirmity. 

15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person but the court has to be careful to ensure that the statement was not the result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of the imagination. It is, therefore, essential that the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, had clear capacity to observe and identify the assailant and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancor. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction." 

In Muthu Kutty & Anr. Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113, the following discussion and the ultimate conclusion are relevant which read as under: 

"14. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the  deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the       requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. 

Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 

Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-      examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 

The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that, 

1. Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. 

1. The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring,  prompting or imagination. 

1. Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. 

1. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. 
2. Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 

1. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. 

1. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. 

1. Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. 

1. When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. 

1. If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court Of India in the case titled as Lakhan  Vs. State Of M.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 2297 Of 2009) Decided on  9.8.2010 has held: 

The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim "Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire", which means "a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth". The doctrine of Dying Declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as, "Evidence Act") as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore,   cannot  be    cross-examined. 

Such   statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases. 

This Court has considered time and again the relevance/ probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has been recorded. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. 

If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution's version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (vide: Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22; Rasheed Beg & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 332; K. R. Reddy &  Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617; Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 5 SCC 254; Babulal & Ors. v. State of M.P., (2003) 12 SCC 490; Muthu Kutty & Anr. v. State, (2005) 9 SCC 113; State of Rajasthan v. Wakteng, AIR 2007 SC 2020; and Sharda v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 2 SCC 85]. 

In Munnawar & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors (2010) 5 SCC 451, this Court held that a dying declaration can be relied upon if the deceased remained alive for a long period of time after the incident and died after recording of the dying declaration. That may be evidence to show that his condition was not overtly critical or precarious when the dying declaration was recorded. 

A dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate would stand on a much higher footing than the declaration recorded by officer of lower rank, for the reason that the competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim, however, circumstances showing anything to the contrary should not be there in the facts of the case. [vide Ravi Chander & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1998) 9 SCC 303; Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1999) 6 SCC 545; Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562; and 

Vikas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 2 SCC 516.] 

In Balak Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165, the question arose as to whether a dying declaration recorded by a higher officer can be discarded in case of multiple dying declarations. The Court held as under:- 

"The circumstances surrounding the dying declaration, though uninspiring, are not strong enough to justify the view that officers as high in the hierarchy as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Civil Surgeon and the District Magistrate hatched a conspiracy to bring a false document into existence. The Civil services have no platform to controvert allegations, howsoever grave and unfounded. It is therefore, necessary that charges calculated to impair their career and character ought not to be accepted except on the clearest proof. We are not prepared to hold that the dying declaration is a fabrication." 

In Sayarabano @ Sultanabegum v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 562, two Dying Declarations had been recorded. As per the first declaration, the deceased had met with an accident. She was hit by the kerosene lamp which fell on her body and caught fire. While recording the second declaration, the Judicial Magistrate asked her why she was changing her statement. The deceased replied that her Mother-in-Law had told her not to give any statement against the family members of her in-laws and that was the reason, why she had not involved any person in the earlier statement. 

But, in fact, it was her Mother-in-Law who threw the kerosene lamp on her and thus, she was burnt. She also stated that her Mother-in-Law was harassing her. In such a situation, this Court held that the second dying declaration was true and inspired confidence. Ill treatment of the decreased was clearly established and completely proved on the basis of the evidence of other witnesses. 

In case, there are inconsistent dying declarations, the Court must rely upon any other evidence, if available, as it is not safe to act only on inconsistent dying declarations and convict the accused.   [Vide Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (2004) 9 SCC 713]. 

In Sher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1426, a case of bride burning, three dying declarations had been recorded. In the first dying declaration, the decreased had denied the role of the accused persons. In second dying declaration deceased attributed a role to the accused but the said declaration did not contain the Certificate of the Doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a declaration, however, the Magistrate, who recorded the declaration, certified that the deceased was in a conscious state of mind and was in a position to make the statement to him. The third dying declaration was recorded by a police officer after the Doctor certified that she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. This Court held that the conviction could be based on the third dying declaration as it was consistent with the second dying declaration and the oral dying declaration made to her uncle, though with some inconsistencies. First declaration was made immediately after she was admitted in the hospital and was under threat and duress by her Mother-in-Law that she would be admitted in hospital only if she would give a statement in favour of the accused persons. 

In Paras Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC126, this Court held that a statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of the   prosecution witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to make the statement. 

In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. & Ors. v.Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 468, this Court, placing reliance upon the earlier Judgment in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684, held that it is not the plurality of dying declarations but the reality thereto that aids weight to the prosecution's case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in a fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. If there is more than one dying declaration, they should be consistent. In case of inconsistencies between two or more dying declarations made by the deceased, the Court has to examine the nature of inconsistencies namely, whether they are material or not and in such a situation, the Court has to examine the multiple dying declarations in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. 

In Heeralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 671, this Court considered the case having two dying declarations, the first recorded by a Magistrate, wherein it was clearly stated that the deceased had tried to set herself ablaze by pouring kerosene on herself. However, the subsequent declaration was recorded by another Magistrate and a contrary statement was made. This Court set aside the conviction after appreciating the evidence and reaching the conclusion that the courts below came to abrupt conclusions on the purported possibility that the relatives of the accused might have compelled the deceased to give a false dying declaration. No material had been brought on record to justify such a conclusion. 

In State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain, (2009) 15 SCC 120, this Court set aside the conviction as there was a variation between the two dying declarations about the manner in which the deceased was set on fire and for the reason that there was no other evidence to connect the accused with the crime. 

In view of the above, the law on the issue of dying declaration can be summarized to the effect that in case, the Court comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration is true and reliable, has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration  and   it   has  not   been   made   under    any tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis for recording conviction. In such an eventuality no corroboration is required. In case, there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case, there are circumstances wherein the declaration had been made, not voluntarily and even otherwise, it is not supported by the other evidence, the Court has to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance. 

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